![]() ![]() Spy Fever was mainly present in the first months of the war, fueled by the press. As in other locales, there were very few convictions, suggesting this was mainly an imaginary danger.Īs France was Germany’s main target at the beginning of the war, the central threat was perceived as German spies sabotaging war mobilization and supply lines. Spy fever, although initially encouraged by the government, in fact spiraled out of control and became a hindrance to public order and the war effort. It is remarkable that in 1914 groups already commonly perceived as internal enemies, such as Jews or organised workers, were not accused of espionage. ![]() The main perpetrators were understood to be foreigners. In many municipalities police were overwhelmed by reports of enemy aircraft sightings, as part of the German population was gripped by, as the Kölnische Volkszeitung stated critically, a “great, nearly frantically agitation”. In some cases local governments were compelled to prove that spies had not poisoned local water supplies by drinking it in ostentatious public displays. Spy Fever in Germany also included reports of poisoned food and water, sabotage, or the intentional spreading of diseases. After almost a dozen people died, the German government finally denied the existence of the “gold cars,” but even this did not end the hunt. Vigilance committees were created, which threatened drivers and hung metal wires across roads at night which became deadly traps. ![]() One of the most common reports included “gold cars,” cars full of gold that the French military were allegedly driving through Germany to Russia for the war effort. In the German Reich, the fear of omnipresent spies was promoted by the government as a measure to strengthen readiness for defence. The German authorities also believed in a general threat posed by spies. The political right gave these images antisemitic connotations as well, so that “Germans, Jews and Spies became nearly synonyms”. Anti-German riots broke out in October 1914. But it was primarily the 50,000 people of German origin living in Britain who raised suspicion, leading to accusations of espionage, but also sabotage and food poisoning. This was found in members of the elite with an unknown origin or in artists seen as living a profligate life. Yet on the other hand, a scapegoat was needed for the setbacks of the British army. On the one hand, these anxieties must be understood against the background of a general invasion anxiety, as the German army was gaining ground quickly in Belgium and France. Although none of the cases investigated turned out to be true, it took the British government nearly a month to deny multiple reports that the state had indeed found and executed spies. Even before the war it was taken for granted that Germany had a highly developed espionage system, so when the war began the British public feverishly participated in the media hunt for German spies. Given its reputation as the home of spy fiction, British society was highly sensitized to the topic of espionage. The following section will focus on Spy Fever as it played out in the war theatres of Great Britain, the German Reich, France, and Russia. However, while spies seemed to be ubiquitous in the public mind and media, there were in reality very few convictions for espionage. This created a situation whereby all citizens could contribute to the national war effort and thus the greater good by remaining vigilant and fighting this threat. ![]() This fear rested on the notion that spies were allegedly everywhere within the nation, and yet also undetectable – constituting a dangerous and duplicitous internal enemy. Many of these myths sought to personalise the enemy, especially the figure of the enemy spy. In the early days of World War I, a period of nervous waiting, the nationalism and propaganda fostered by both state and society in all war theatres created a breeding ground for collective myths. ![]()
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